

Security Meetup

Hamburg
Google Meet



Pwning a K8s Cluster

Agenda

Betreiben einer Container Plattform

Image Security

Runtime Security

K8s Resource Validation



Betreiben einer Containerplattform

(1/2)

Organizational

Infrastructure

Container

Orchestration Management

Image Distribution

Secrets und Keys



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Betreiben einer Containerplattform

(2/2)

Network

Storage

Logging & Monitoring



Betreiben einer Containerplattform

(2/2)

Network

Storage

Logging & Monitoring



Betreiben einer Containerplattform

(2/2)

Network

Storage

Logging & Monitoring



Betreiben einer Containerplattform

(2/2)

Network

Storage

Logging & Monitoring



Organizational

Default

Data Classification

Security Concept (Threat modeling)

Define Role & Responsibilities

High

Risk & Vulnerability Management Process

Infrastruktur

Default

Updated software components

Documented infrastructure (nodes,net,containers)

Common Best-Practices

High

Enable SELinux or AppArmor on all nodes.

Use container-specific operating systems

Container

Default

Least Privilege

Images include only needed components

Lint Dockerfiles for common mistakes

Common Best-Practices

High

Seccomp-Profile

Image signatures (Content Trust)

Orchestration Management

Default

Ensure availability of the (master)nodes

High

Only containers with same level of exposure on the same node

Image Distribution

Default

HA Registry

Garbage Collection

Automated Vuln. Scans

High

Admission Controller based on Vuln. Scans

Secret & Keys

Default

RBAC or simliar model

No sensitive information in Dockerfiles

Rotate certificates

Network

Default

Choose a production ready network driver.

Limit published ports to minimum

Storage

Default

Choose a production ready storage driver.

Regular backup of persistent data.

Multi Tenant FS-Shares Teilen (OPA). Validierung PVC

Logging & Audit

Default


Verify logs are stored

Audit logs append only

Image Security



Image Scanning



Graphic by anchore.com

Exploiting Spring Break (CVE-2017-8046)

Application

```
MyEntitiesRepository.java x
6  import org.springframework.data.repository.query.Param;
7  import org.springframework.data.rest.core.annotation.RepositoryRestResource;
8
9  @RepositoryRestResource(collectionResourceRel = "entity", path = "entity")
10 public interface MyEntitiesRepository extends PagingAndSortingRepository<MyEntity, Long> {
11     List<MyEntity> findByName(@Param("name") String name);
12 }

MyEntity.java x
8  @Entity
9  public class MyEntity {
10     @Id
11     @GeneratedValue(strategy = GenerationType.AUTO)
12     private long id;
13     private String name;
14     private String attribute;
15     public long getId() {
16         return id;
17     }
18     public void setId(long id) {
19         this.id = id;
20     }
}
```


Exploiting Spring Break (CVE-2017-8046)

JSON Patch (rfc6902)

PATCH /file.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: sookocheff.combr

Content-Type: application/json

If-Match: "e0036bbc6f"

[description of changes]

Patch-Operations

[add, remove, replace,
move, copy, test]

```
{ "op": "replace",  
  "path": "/test", "value": 1 }
```

!For Livehacking content please use video recording!

```
[leon@arch ~]$ echo "For Livehacking content please use video recording"
For Livehacking content please use video recording
[leon@arch ~]$
[leon@arch ~]$ █
```

Exploiting Spring Break (CVE-2017-8046)

Übersicht Scanner (1/2)

Scanner

Hersteller

Lizenz



Clair

CoreOS

Apache-2.0



Anchore

Anchore, Inc

Apache-2.0



Microscanner

Aqua Security
Software Ltd.

See Terms



Dagda

Elías Grande

Apache-2.0

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Übersicht Scanner (2/2)

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Hersteller

Lizenz



Trivy

Aqua Security
Software Ltd.

Apache-2.0



Atomic

Project Atomic.
(RedHat)

Apache-2.0

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Sichere Docker Basis-Images

Basis Images im Test (OS)



ubuntu:bionic

kritisch	0
hoch	17
mittel	37
niedrig	9



debian:buster

kritisch	1
hoch	12
mittel	46
niedrig	19



alpine:latest

kritisch	0
hoch	0
mittel	0
niedrig	0

Image Scan mit Trivy am 06.04.2020 durchgeführt.

Basis Images im Test (Language)



python:3.8

kritisch	10
hoch	124
mittel	1198
niedrig	80



openjdk:11

kritisch	1
hoch	23
mittel	118
niedrig	27



node:lts

kritisch	19
hoch	628
mittel	2939
niedrig	144

Image Scan mit Trivy am 06.04.2020 durchgeführt.

Basis Images im Test (Python)



python:3.8

	Default	Slim	Alpine
kritisch	10	1	0
hoch	124	12	0
mittel	1198	65	0
niedrig	80	20	0

Image Scan mit Trivy am 06.04.2020 durchgeführt.

Basis Images im Test (OpenJDK)



openjdk:11

	Default	Slim	Alpine*
kritisch	1	1	0
hoch	23	12	0
mittel	118	54	0
niedrig	27	19	0

Image Scan mit Trivy am 06.04.2020 durchgeführt. * Used adoptopenjdk for alpine

Basis Images im Test (Node)



node:lts

	Default	Slim	Alpine
kritisch	19	3	0
hoch	628	38	0
mittel	2939	88	0
niedrig	144	27	0

Image Scan mit Trivy am 06.04.2020 durchgeführt.

Distroless

Language focused docker images, minus the operating system.



Nur: Anwendung + Abhängigkeiten

Keine Paketmanager, Shell oder Linux Tools

Plugins für Maven und Gradle

Debug Images für Busybox.

Since 1.17 debug feature.

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```

Distroless - Building Image

Runtime Security



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```

Exploring the Cluster


Pod Security Policies



Implemented as Admission Controller

Conditions that Pods must meet

SE-Linux



Protection of the Host ✓

Containers from another ✓

SE-Linux Label for Docker

User:Role:Type:Level.

SE-Linux

Type Enforcement

Rules are based on process type

Label container files >>**svirt_sandbox_file**<<

Multi-Category Security (MCS) Separation

Unique value assigned to level field (each container)

App-Armor

Whitelist

Linux capabilities

Network access

File permissions



Bane

Custom & better AppArmor profile generator for Docker containers.

K8s Resource Validation



Common problems

Workflow is privileged - (C) High, (I)Low, (I)Low

Running as root - (C) High, (I)Low, (I)Low

CapNetRaw - (C) High, (I)None, (I)Low

Kube-Scan

Octarine k8s cluster risk assessment tool



KCCSS (Kubernetes Common Configuration Scoring System)

Deployed in K8s

Accessible via webui

Kube-Scan

Octarine k8s cluster risk assessment tool



RESOURCE
webserver-for-tests

CLUSTER

NAMESPACE
webserver1

KIND
Deployment

MEDIUM

RISK

Workload has a container(s) with NET_RAW capability

[show less](#)

HIGH

CONFIDENTIALITY IMPACT

This capability enables ARP spoofing from the container, which means UDP packets can be sent with a forged source IP, etc. This enables the container to perform Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on the host network

LOW

AVAILABILITY IMPACT

This capability enables the container to craft malicious raw packet, such as Ping of Death

LOW

EXPLOITABILITY

Fairly unlikely to be exploited

LOCAL

ATTACK VECTOR

Local access required

CLUSTER

SCOPE

Impact the cluster

DESCRIPTION

The capability NET_RAW allows the container to craft any packet, including "malformed" or malicious packets

Kube-Hunter

Aqua Security

Hunt for security weaknesses in Kubernetes clusters



kube-hunter

Remote Scanning

Im Cluster

Kube-Hunter (Demo)

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Kube-Hunter (Vuln.)

Vielen Dank!

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