# Sicher durch die KI-Revolution

Risiken verstehen, Anwendungen sicher entwickeln

Clemens Hübner

inovex GmbH

Heise devSec Frühjahr 2024



## **Euer Hintergrund?**

Klassische Softwareentwicklung

Data Science / Machine Learning





#### **Clemens Hübner**

Software Security Engineer @ inovex, Munich Enabling teams to design, implement and test secure software



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
clemens.huebner@inovex.de




@inovexgmbh



@inovexlife









#### **Questions for today**

- What is the attack surface of an AI software system?
- What risks and weaknesses should be considered in AI software?
- Which measures and best practices exist for secure development of AI software?





## What is the attack surface of an AI software system?



An "AI software system" is a computer program or application that utilizes artificial intelligence techniques and algorithms to perform tasks, make decisions, or analyze data to deliver intelligent functionality within software applications.

(BSI)





An "AI software system" is a **computer program** or **application** that utilizes artificial intelligence techniques and algorithms to perform tasks, make decisions, or analyze data to deliver intelligent functionality within **software applications**. (BSI)

I can do programming!
I can do applications!





An "AI software system" is a computer program or application that utilizes artificial intelligence techniques and algorithms to perform tasks, make decisions, or analyze data to deliver intelligent functionality within software applications.

(BSI)

I can do AI!
I can do data!






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An AI software system is a software system containing an AI component.





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




Design Implement Build software component























Morris II AI worm can steal your confidential data and infect ChatGPT and Gemini

## Google Brain researchers demo method to hijack neural networks



ChatGPT Continues to Fail in Fight Against **Malicious Content** 

#### Exercise caution when building off LLMs

by Vishwa Pandagle — February 8, 2023 - Updated on May 4, 2023

30 August 2023

ADVENTURES IN 21ST-CENTURY HACKING -

AI-powered Bing Chat spills its secrets via prompt injection attack

BENJ EDWARDS - 2/10/2023, 8:11 PM





#### **Excursus: Attackers**


#### **Objectives**

National Interest

Personal Gain

Personal Fame

Curiosity




Knowledge



## What risks and weaknesses should be considered in AI software?





#### **Demo software: Credit Score Service**




Use Case: Calculate creditworthiness of applicants

#### Input:

- Demographics
- Payment History
- ...


#### **Output:**

- Credit Score







#### **Overview attacks**






#### **Overview attacks**










#### **Backdoor Attacks**

Training data is manipulated in a way an attacker can obtain wrong results later.





#### **Backdoor Attacks**





#### **Prevent Backdoor Attacks**

#### **Never trust user input!**

- question training data, handle untrusted data carefully
- validate/sanitize input

#### **Never trust data quality!**

- perform quality control on train data
- train decentral, maybe even federated
- distort train data
- prevent overfitting




### **Poisoning Attacks**

Training data is manipulated so the attacker reduces the results of the model, e.g. its efficiency or correctness.





## **Poisoning Attacks**









#### **Prevent Poisoning Attacks**

#### **Never trust user input!**

- question training data, handle untrusted data carefully
- validate/sanitize input
- handle data as part of supply chain

#### **Never trust data quality!**


- perform quality control on train data
- broaden train data, use federated learning
- use golden dataset for stability checks





#### **Evasion Attacks**

The attacker manipulates the input to the model to influence its results





#### **Evasion Attacks**

Based on the attackers possibilities, we differentiate between


- Whitebox attacks, where the attacker has access to the model itself
- Blackblox attacks, where the attacker has no access to the model



#### White Box Adversarial Attacks



x
"panda"
57.7% confidence



 $sign(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}}J(\boldsymbol{\theta},\boldsymbol{x},y))$  "nematode" 8.2% confidence



 $x + \epsilon sign(\nabla_x J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, y))$ "gibbon"

99.3 % confidence



EXPLAINING AND HARNESSING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES (Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens & Christian Szegedy, Google Inc.)

#### **Black Box Adversarial Attacks**











Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification (Kevin Eykholt et al., 2018)





#### **Evasion Attacks**

- Small changes to applicants data might cause bigger changes in model output
- The more control the attacker has over the input, the easier attacks are







#### **Prevent Evasion Attacks**

## Expect users to be attackers!

- monitor usage, especially inputs
- restrict access
- sanitize inputs and outputs

#### Aim for a robust model!

- train adversarial examples
- distort input
- adversarial-aware distillation




#### **Model Theft**

The attacker uses his access to the trained model as an oracle

Classifying his own data set using the oracle allows him to train his own model









ino 37


### **Model Inversion**

The attacker uses his access to the model to get information about the source data.





### **Model Inversion**






### **Membership Inference**

The attacker can obtain the information if a single piece of data was part of the training set.





## **Membership Inference**











#### **Prevent Model Theft / Inversion**

**Limit access to the system!** 

- restrict and monitor access
- rate limiting

Control creation and content of model

- prevent overfitting
- reduce model output





### **Attribute Inference**

The attacker has a set of attributes related to a piece of input data

By attribute inference, he can get information about further, private attributes





### **Attribute Inference**


- The attacker has a set of attributes related to a piece of input data
- By attribute inference, he can get information about further, private attributes





### **Attribute Inference**





last name: Hübner first name: Clemens

age: 30

profession: Security Engineer

location: Munich ???

married: no





#### **Prevent Attribute Inference**

# Secure access to user data

- restrict access
- monitor output

# Take privacy into account

- preprocess data, e.g.
   obfuscate sensitive data
   in trainings data
- use differential privacy
- in general evaluate model privacy





### **Data Leakage**

Data might get stolen and published, causing material or immaterial damage






### **Data Leakage**

HDFC Bank's NBFC arm confirms data leak of

customers

2 min read . Arti Singh

07 Mar 2023, 09:01 PM IST



# Data breach confirmed by Ray-Ban after leak of over 70M customers' records

SC Staff May 23, 2023





### **Prevent Data Leakage**

# Secure operation infrastructure


- keep environments separated
- restrict access
- defense in depth to mitigate effect of flaws


#### **Secure training infrastructure**


- minimize data usage, anonymize data
- reduce retention of data
- encrypt & restrict access












Supply chain attacks!

 models are part of the supply chain





Design Implement

Build

### Don't forget the traditional part

Typical attacks or security risks also occur here

- Supply Chain Attacks
- Attacks on authentication and authorization
- Logic and design flaws
- Security Misconfiguration
- Missing Logging/Monitoring/Alerting

+ Integration into development and business processes





# Which best practices exist for secure development of AI software?



### **Best practices for secure AI software**


- > **Transparency**: documentation of model, data processing, feature extraction, potential bias and consequences
- > Traceability: document development decisions
- $\rightarrow$  **Explainability**: outputs and results should be explainable even when the model is a black-box model itself  $\rightarrow$  tools like Lime or Skater might help
- Quality assurance: check the code quality regularly to avoid vulnerabilities and risks



## **Connected disciplines**



 check for bias and misrepresentation in data



- special care required when processing PII
- minimize data, limit storage
- use anonymization





### **Further resources**



#### **Further Resources**

- > BSI Leitfaden
  - AI Security Concerns in a Nutshell
  - Adversarial Deep Learning
  - Provision or Use of External Data or Trained Models
- > OWASP
  - AI Exchange
  - OWASP ML Top Ten
  - OWASP Top Ten for LLMs
- > NCSC Guidelines for secure AI system development





### **Takeaways**

Al software is also software known methods and measures remain useful and important

New threats and attacks emerge and need to be covered

Transfer existing knowledge accordingly and adapt threat model







# Vielen Dank!

inovex is an IT project center driven by innovation and quality, focusing its services on 'Digital Transformation'.

- founded in 1999
- 500+ employees
- 8 offices across
   Germany









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